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CHAPTER 8 
Contracts and Commercial Law 
SURVEY STAFFt 
§ 8.1. Consumer Law - Chapter 93A- Employment Contracts.* Mas-
sachusetts General Laws chapter 93A, commonly known as the Massa-
chusetts Consumer Protection Act (the ''Act''), 1 declares in section 2 that 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or 
commerce are unlawful.2 Section 9 of the Act provides a private cause of 
action to consumers who suffer a loss as a result of such unlawful prac-
tices by business per~ons. 3 In 1972 ~ection 11 was inserted4 to extend the 
same right to business persons.5 Section 11 thus provides a private cause 
of action to business persons who suffer a loss as a result of unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices by other business persons.6 
Availability of a remedy under chapter 93A, section 11 depends in part 
on whether the parties are engaged in "any trade or commerce" with 
respect to the transaction at issue. 7 The private cause of action created by 
section 11 has been held to be available to a prospective advertiser against 
a newspaper, 8 by a client against his booking agency, 9 and by the owner of 
t Carolyn Davis Dailey, Madelyn Leopold, Andrea Petersen, Ettore A. Santucci, Conant 
M. Webb. 
* Madelyn Leopold, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 8.1. 1 See Manning v. Zuckerman, 388 Mass. 8, 8, 444 N.E.2d 1262, 1262-63 (1983). 
2 G.L. c. 93A, § 2(a). See Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688,694,322 N.E.2d 
768, 773 (1975). 
3 G.L. c. 93A, § 9(1). 
• Acts of 1972, c. 614, § 2. 
5 Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 9&-97, 360 N.E.2d 870, 871-72 (1977). Section 11 provides 
in pertinent part: 
Any person who engages in the conduct of any trade or commerce and who suffers 
any loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment 
by another person who engages in any trade or commerce of an unfair method of 
competition or any unfair or deceptive act or practice declared unlawful by section 
two ... may ... bring an action in the superior court, ... whether by way of original 
complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party action for damages and such 
equitable relief, including an injunction, as the court deems to be necessary and 
proper. 
6 Id. 
7 See supra note 5; Begelfer v. Najarian, 381 Mass. 177, 190, 409 N.E.2d 167, 175 (1980). 
8 PMP Assocs. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 366 Mass. 593, 321 N.E.2d 915 (1975). 
9 Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 96, 360 N.E.2d 870, 870 (1977). 
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a duplex house against a contractor. 10 In some cases, how~ver, the plain-
tiff has been denied a remedy under section 11 because thie parties or the 
transaction at issue were found not to meet the statutory !requirement of 
"trade or commerce." 11 Often relying on language from $ection 9 cases, 
the courts in these cases have suggested that the statutory requirement is 
not met where the transaction complained of is strictly private in nature 
and is in no way in the ordinary course of a trade or business .12 
Twice during the Survey year the Supreme Judicial Court held that the 
distinction between a private transaction and one that occurs in the 
conduct of any trade or commerce excludes transactions involving 
employer-employee relationships from the scope of chaptqr 93A. In Man-
ning v. Zuckerman, 13 the Court held that unfair or decepti'ye acts commit-
ted in the context of an employer-employee relationship ~o not occur in 
the ordinary course of any trade or commerce as contej:nplated by the 
statuteY One month later, in Weeks v. Harbor National Bank,t5 the Court 
reaffirmed its decision in Manning, holding that an employee's allegations 
of unfair and deceptive acts committed by his employer in discharging him 
were outside the scope of chapter 93A, section 11.16 
In Manning, the plaintiff was employed by Atlantic Monthly Company, 
a co-defendant, as an editor of its magazine from 1966 to ~980. 17 In 1980, 
the defendant Zuckerman sought to purchase all the compfiny's outstand-
ing stock. 18 He assured the stockholders that Manning \\jould remain as 
editor of the magazine. 19 The company and Manning sig$ed an employ-
ment contract to that effect in April, 1980, at which time Zuckerman 
effected his purchase of the stock.20 Zuckerman personally guaranteed 
10 Linthicum v. Archambault, 379 Mass. 381, 398 N.E.2d 482 (1979). 
11 Begelfer v. Najarian, 381 Mass. 177, 191, 409 N.E.2d 167, 176 (1980) (defendant 
creditors on a promissory note, who ran a pharmacy as their usual business, not in trade or 
commerce as regards the note); Second Boston Corp. v. Smith, 377 Mas~. 918 (1979) (order 
for summary disposition stating that claim of employer against employee for breach of duties 
of employment not a section ll claim); Newton v. Moffie, l3 Mass. ApJi>. Ct. 462, 476, 434 
N.E.2d 656, 659 (1982) (dispute between partners regarding breach of!fiduciary duty not 
section ll claim). 1 
12 See Begelfer v. Najarian, 381 Mass. 177, 190, 409 N.E.2d 167, 1f5-76 (1980) (citing 
Lantner v. Carson, 374 Mass. 606, 608, 373 N.E.2d 973, 974-75 (l978))j Lantner held that 
section 9 does not apply to a homeowner's sale of her private residence because such a 
transaction is "strictly private in nature" and not in the ordinary course of trade or business. 
/d. at 607-08, 373 N.E.2d at 974. 
13 388 Mass. 8, 444 N.E.2d 1262 (1983). 
14 /d. at 14-15, 444 N.E.2d at 1266. 
15 388 Mass. 141, 445 N.E.2d 605 (1983). 
16 Id. at 144, 445 N.E.2d at 607. 
17 388 Mass. at 9, 444 N.E.2d at 1263. 
18 /d. 
19 /d. 
20 /d. 
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payment of certain "additional retirement benefits" in the contract if it 
were to be terminated for any reason other than for cause.21 
Despite his earlier assurances, Zuckerman repeatedly interfered with 
Manning's editorial activities after taking control of the company .22 On 
October 1, 1980, the company and Manning executed a new contract that 
terminated·the April1980 agreement.23 Under the new contract, Manning 
received a leave of absence through May 31, 1981, and agreed to consult 
with the Atlantic staff from time to time during October 1980.24 Pursuant 
to the terms of the new agreement, Manning was to be treated as an 
employee for the purpose of pension plan benefits and health coverage.25 
Unless the parties mutually agreed "to extend his employment beyond 
May 31, 1981,'' however, all reciprocal obligations would cease except for 
certain retirement provisions, some of which were personally guaranteed 
by Zuckerman.26 When the first retirement benefit payment came due in 
November 1981, both defendants refused to pay it. Consequently, Man-
ning commenced his action under section 11 of chapter 93A, alleging that 
the defendants committed unfair and deceptive acts in connection with 
the agreement terminating his employment.27 The defendants moved for 
dismissal of the section 11 claim, asserting failure to state a cause of 
action upon which relief could be granted.28 That motion was allowed, and 
the plaintiff applied for direct appellate review. 29 The Supreme Judicial 
Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the section 11 claim.30 
In its opinion the Court first considered whether the Legislature in-
tended, in section 11, to grant a cause of action to a former employee 
against his former employer in a dispute arising out of the employment 
relationship. 31 Manning had characterized his position subsequent to the 
October 1980 contract as that of an independent consultant in business for 
himself.32 The Court, however, determined that Manning was an em-
21 ld. 
22 !d. 
23 !d. 
24 Jd. at 10, 444 N.E.2d at 1263. 
25 ld. 
26 !d. 
27 /d. Manning also sought a declaratory judgment concerning the contractual rights and 
obligations of the parties under G.L. c. 231A, §§ I, 5, and damages for breach of contract. 
Manning, 388 Mass. at 8 n.2, 444 N.E.2d at 1263 n.2. The Court has noted that a plaintiff 
seeking relief under section 11 need not make a written demand on the defendant as a 
condition precedent to bringing an action. See Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 99, 360 N.E.2d 
870, 873 (1977). 
28 Manning, 388 Mass. at 9, 444 N.E.2d at 1263. 
29 !d. 
30 ld. 
31 Id. at 10-ll, 444 N.E.2d at 1264. 
32 !d. 
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ployee of the company at the times relevant to his section 11 action.33 
According to the Court, the words of the agreement revealed that he was 
an employee through May 31, 1981.34 The agreement also stated that 
Manning would be terminated on May 31, 1981, unless the parties mutu-
ally agreed "to extend his employment." 35 The Court concluded that the 
alleged unfair and deceptive acts occurred in the context of lhe parties' 
employment relationship, "and not in an arms-length commercial transac-
tion between distinct business entities. " 36 
Finding that the plaintiff was an employee, the Court then considered 
the general question of whether employment contracts constituted trade 
or commerce within the meaning of the Act.37 While the Court noted that 
chapter 93A is broad in scope, it concluded that the Legislature did not 
intend the statute to embrace employment contract disputes.38 The Court 
interpreted the reference in section 11 to unfair or deceptive acts commit-
ted by ''another person who engages in any trade or commerce',_ to refer 
to marketplace transactions, not to claims arising in the relationship 
between an employee and the organization of which he is a member.39 
Although the statutory definition of trade or commerce includes the "of-
fering for sale ... any services," the Court held that the services con-
templated were those offered for sale to the public in a business transac-
tion, and not those offered by an employee to an employer. 40 An em-
ployee and an employer, the Court stated, "are not engaged in trade or 
commerce with each other." 41 
The Court continued its analysis by considering the employer-employee 
relationship within the general context of the Act. 42 The Court pointed to 
the broad language of the statute that embraces "any trade or commerce 
33 Jd. at 11, 444 N.E.2d at 1264. 
34 Jd. 
35 Jd. 
36 Jd. 
37 Jd. at 13, 444 N.E.2d at 1265. 
38 Jd. at 12, 444 N.E.2d at 1265. The Court noted that employees enjoy comprehensive 
protections from abuses of the employment relationship, both under state law and under the 
National Labor Relations Act. Jd. at 11-12, 444 N.E.2d at 1264. 
39 Id. at 13, 444 N.E.2d at 1265. 
40 I d. The Court also relied on the definitional section of the Act, section 1(b), to find that 
employment agreements do not constitute trade or commerce. Jd. G.L. c. 93A, § 1(b) 
provides: 
'Trade' and 'commerce' shall include the advertising, the offering for sale, rent or 
lease, the sale, rent, lease or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or 
intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of 
value wherever situate, and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly 
affecting the people of this commonwealth. 
41 388 Mass. at 14, 444 N.E.2d at 1265. 
42 Jd. 
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directly or indirectly affecting the people of this commonwealth." 43 Such 
broad language, according to the Court, indicates the Legislature's inten-
tion was to protect the public as a whole.44 The Court interpreted that 
intent as referring to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the mar-
ketplace.45 In contrast, contract disputes between an employer and an 
employee, the Court stated, are principally "private in nature." 46 The 
Court concluded that claims of employees against employers are excluded 
from the protection of the Act. 47 The Court therefore affirmed the trial 
judge's dismissal of the plaintiff's section 11 claim.48 
In Manning the Court halted the plaintiff's attempted expansion of 
section 11 into the area of employment disputes. The Court reached its 
decision regarding the proper scope of section 11 by reference to the 
broad purposes of chapter 93A - to improve commercial relations be-
tween business persons and between consumers and businesses. 49 Case 
law under section 9 had already established that commercial relations 
between consumers and businesses do not include private transactions.50 
Manning showed that transactions within entities are also outside the 
scope of commercial relationships between business persons as covered 
by section 11. In thus distinguishing private from commercial activity 
under section 11, the Court focused on two factors: the character of the 
parties and the character of the transaction. Emphasis on these factors 
reinforced the principle that a section 11 dispute arises only between 
persons engaged in an arms-length transaction in a business context. A 
dispute is private under the statute if it arises within the business entity 
itself. In addition to this general outline of the scope of section 11, the 
Court gave special consideration to the particular relationship between 
employer and employee. Manning establishes, as a matter of law, that the 
employment relationship is not covered by chapter 93A.51 
This conclusion is borne out by the Supreme Judicial Court's decision 
in a second employment contract case arising one month after Manning. 
43 /d., (quoting G.L. c. 93A, § 1(b)). 
44 /d. at 14, 444 N.E.2d at 1266. 
45 /d. See Rice, New Private Remedies for Consumers: The Amendment of Chapter 93A, 
54 MASS. L.Q. 307, 308 (1969). 
46 388 Mass. at 14, 444 N.E.2d at 1255. 
47 /d. at 14-15, 444 N .E.2d at 1255. See Second Boston Corp. v. Smith, 377 Mass. 918 
(1979) (summary dismissal of a claim by an employer against its employee for breach of duty 
as being outside the scope. of G.L. c. 93A). 
48 388 Mass. at 15, 444 N.E.2d at 1266. 
49 /d. at 12, 444 N.E.2d at 1265. 
50 Lantner v. Carson, 374 Mass. 606, 607-08, 373 N.E.2d 973, 974-75 (1978). See supra 
note 12. 
51 388 Mass. at 15, 444 N.E.2d at 1266. 
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In Weeks v. Harbor National Bank,52 the Court held that ap employee's 
section 11 claim that his employer committed unfair and deceptive acts in 
discharging him was outside the scope of chapter 93A.53 
In Weeks, the plaintiff accepted employment with the defendant bank 
after the employer promised that it would have a pension lor retirement 
plan in effect by the end of the year.54 The defendant, horever, never 
formulated or implemented any such plan.55 Two years later, the bank's 
major shareholders sold their controlling interests in the bank. 56 The new 
management reviewed Weeks' performance and concluded that he lacked 
the requisite skills to hold his position.57 Subsequently, We~ks was asked 
to resign.58 Weeks brought suit against the employer in s*perior court, 
alleging, among other counts, violation of chapter 93A, section 11.59 The 
judge ruled, as a matter of law, that section 11 did not apply to the 
·employment relationship presented in the case.60 The Supreme Judicial 
Court granted a request for direct appellate review .61 i 
Relying on its decision in Manning, the Court held that th~ plaintiff had 
no section 11 remedy for his dispute with his employer.62 The Court found 
that the alleged deceptive acts occurred in the context of the parties' 
employer-employee relationship and not in a commercial transaction be-
tween distinct business entities.63 As an employee, ac~rding to the 
Court, the plaintiff failed to meet the section 11 requireme t that he be a 
business person engaged in trade or commerce with an ther business 
person.64 
Manning, reinforced by Weeks, thus demonstrates the Court's unwill-
ingness to extend chapter 93A to disputes arising in the qontext of the 
employment relationship. Practitioners representing empl~yees in such 
disputes should tum instead to the recent Massachusetts ca~e law involv-
ing employment at will. The Court itself in Manning cited some of those 
cases in support of its denial of a chapter 93A cause of action.65 This 
52 388 Mass. 141, 445 N.E.2d 605 (1983). 
53 /d. at 144, 445 N.E.2d at 607. 
54 /d. at 143, 445 N.E.2d at 606-07. 
55 !d. at 143, 445 N.E.2d at 607. 
56 /d. 
57 !d. at 143-44, 445 N.E.2d at 607. 
58 !d. at 144, 445 N.E.2d at 607. 
59 /d. at 142, 445 N.E.2d at 606. 
60 /d. at 144, 445 N.E.2d at 607. 
61 /d. at 141, 445 N.E.2d at 605. 
62 /d. at 144, 445 N.E.2d at 607. 
63 /d. 
64 /d. 
65 388 Mass. at 11-12,444 N.E.2d at 1264. See, e.g., Gram v. Liberty ~ut. Ins. Co., 384 
Mass. 659, 429 N.E.2d 21 (1981) (employee at will entitled to identifiable, reasonably 
anticipated future compensation, based on past services, after discharge without cause); 
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reference by the Court perhaps suggests that any future expansion in the 
protection of non-union employees from wrongful discharge will occur in 
the area of employment at will . 
. · 
§ 8.2. Real Estate Options To Purchase Leased Premises.* An option is a 
unilateral contract which does not bind the optionee to do anything, but 
grants him the right to accept or reject the optionor's offer in accordance 
with the terms of the option agreement.t It has long been recognized at 
common law that when an option is exercised in conformity with its 
terms, it automatically ripens into a bilateral purchase and sale contract, 
which is binding upon both parties and can, in appropriate circumstances, 
be enforced by spc;cific performance.2 In order to exercise the option 
effectively, the optionee must act unconditionally and in precise accord 
with the agreed terms of the option.3 Options for the sale of real estate, for 
example, may require acceptance by a promise to pay the purchase price 
or by actual tender of the purchase price. 4 Timely payment of the price is 
a condition for the effective exercise of the option only if the option 
agreement unequivocally requires actual tender of the purchase price 
before the termination date of the option. 5 
These settled principles are reaffirmed in a number of Massachusetts 
cases. In Cities Service Oil Co. v. National Shawmut Bank,6 for example, 
a lease granted the lessee an option to purchase the leased premises 
during the term of the lease.7 The option could be exercised by the lessee 
giving to the lessor written notice of its intention to purchase and making a 
down payment of $200 "on notice of intention to exercise the option."8 
On the date of expiration of the lease, the lessee mailed a letter to the 
lessor, accompanied by a certified draft for $200, which was not received 
by the lessor until the next day.9 The lessor refused to convey the 
property .10 The Supreme Judicial Court held that the option had not been 
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977) ("bad faith" 
termination of employment at will contract was actionable breach of contract). 
* Ettore Santucci, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 8.2. 1 '1 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 618 (3d ed. 1961 & 
Supp. 1983). 
2 /d. § 61A; 1A A. CoRBIN, CoNTRACTS § 259 (1963 & Supp. 1981). 
3 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 610, at 205-06; 1A A. CoRBIN, supra note 2, at§ 264, at 
523. 
4 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 610, at 205-06. 
5 /d. at 206. 
8 342 Mass. 108, 172 N.E.2d 104 (1961). 
7 Jd. at 109, 172 N.E.2d at 105. 
8 /d. 
9 /d. 
10 /d. at 109-10, 172 N.E.2d at 105. 
222 1983 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 8.2 
timely exercised.U The Court found that the language lof the option 
required both the giving of notice and the payment of $200 !accompanying 
the notice of exercise of the option. 12 The Court construe~ this condition 
as mandating payment in legal tender prior to the expiration of the lease.13 
Since the draft was not legal tender and was not received before the term 
of the lease had expired, the Court held that no bilateral contract of 
purchase and sale arose between the lessee and the lessor.14 The holding 
in Cities Service implied that if payment by means of legal tender had been 
made so as to be received before the expiration of the lease, the option 
would have been properly exercised despite the fact that both the balance 
I 
of the payment and the conveyance of title would have occurred after the 
expiration of the lease. 15 I 
An express time limitation for the conveyance of the leasied premises to 
the lessee following notice of its intention to exercise the p~Irchase option 
was the issue in C. & W. Dyeing & Cleaning Co. v. De Qu'attro. 16 In that 
case the lease provided that if the lessee gave two months written notice 
to the lessor of its intention to purchase the leased premises, the lessor 
would convey the property to the lessee on or before the expiration of 
such notice. 17 The lessee gave the lessor written notice of its intention to 
exercise the option more than two months prior to the expiration of the 
lease term. 18 The Court held that as soon as the lessee gavel written notice 
within the agreed time, it duly accepted the lessor's irrevbcable offer to 
convey the leased premises and a bilateral purchase and $ale agreement 
came into effect at that moment. 19 The Court then disting~ished between 
exercise of the option and consummation of the purchasd and sale con-
tract, and found that the lease contained the further condition that the 
contract be performed on or before the expiration of the two months 
notice and, regardless of when the option was exercised, not later than 
five years from the commencement of the term of the lease.20 Since the 
purchase and s<tle contract could not be consummated within the stated 
time limits because of the lessee's inability to pay the purchase price, the 
Court held that the lessor was not thereafter obligated lo convey the 
property. 21 ' 
n !d. at 110, 172 N.E.2d at 105. 
12 /d. at 110-11, 172 N.E.2d at 106. 
13 !d. at 111, 172 N.E.2d at 106. 
14 !d. 
15 17 Mass. App. Ct. 262, 266, 457 N.E.2d 668, 671 (1983). 
16 344 Mass. 739, 184 N.E.2d 61 (1962). 
17 !d. at 740, 184 N.E.2d at 62-63. 
18 !d. at 740, 184 N.E.2d at 63. 
19 !d. at 741, 184 N.E.2d at 63. 
20 Jd. at 741-42, 184 N.E.2d at 64. 
21 !d. at 742, 184 N.E.2d at 64. 
§ 8.2 CONTRACTS AND COMMERCIAL LAW 223 
A slight variation on the same basic pattern was discussed in American 
Oil Co. v. Cherubini,22 where the lessee was given an option to purchase 
the demised premises at any time during the term of the lease for an 
agreed price.23 The option could be exercised by sending written notice to 
the lessor. 24 The agreement further provided that settlement of the pur-
chase price and conveyance of the property to the lessee were to be made 
within sixty days of the giving of notice.25 The Court held that the option 
had been effectively exercised by the sending of written notice within the 
stated time, without concomitant tender of the purchase price.26 Accord-
ing to the Court, the obligation of the lessee to pay the purchase price and 
the obligation of the lessor to convey the premises by deed were concur-
rent and mutually dependent, and tender of payment was not required to 
exercise the option. 27 
During the Survey year, the Massachusetts Court of Appeals in 
Roberts-Neustadter Furs, Inc. v. Simon 28 reaffirmed these principles in 
the case of an option to purchase contained in a real estate lease. The 
appeals court construed the language in the option regarding manner of 
acceptance strictly and held that when the lessee/optionee exercises the 
purchase option in exact accord with its terms, the lessor/optionor be-
comes automatically bound to convey the leased premises.29 
In Roberts-Neustadter Furs, Inc. v. Simon, the plaintiff-lessee leased 
storefront property from the defendant-lessor for a five-year term begin-
ning in 1975.30 The lease contained an option to purchase the land and 
building containing the leased premises at any time before the expiration 
of the initial five-year term of the lease.31 The lease agreement provided 
that the option should be exercised "by notice in writing stating the date 
on which title shall pass; in no event, however, shall the date specified by 
lessee for passage of title be less than sixty (60) days or more than ninety 
(90) days from the date of giving such notice." 32 
One day before the termination of the 1975lease and after three months 
of negotiations, the parties signed a new lease. 33 Immediately thereafter 
and before the expiration of the initial five-year lease term, the lessee 
22 351 Mass. 581, 222 N.E.2d 892 (1967). 
23 Id. at 582, 222 N.E.2d at 893. 
24 Id. at 583, 222 N.E.2d at 893. 
25 /d. at 583, 222 N.E.2d at 893-94. 
26 /d. at 585, 222 N.E.2d at 894. 
27 /d. at 585, 222 N.E.2d at 895. 
28 17 Mass. App. Ct. 262, 457 N.E.2d 668 (1983). 
29 /d. at 269, 457 N.E.2d at 673. 
30 Id. at 263, 457 N.E.2d at 669. 
31 ld. 
32 I d. at 263, 457 N .E.2d at 669-70. 
33 /d. 
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notified the lessor in writing that it was exercising its option to purchase 
the premises for the agreed price.34 The lessee's letter designated a date 
eighty-five days from the date of the letter, as the closing date.35 On that 
date the lessee tendered the purchase price and requested passage of 
title.36 The lessor refused to convey the property on the ground that the 
option had not been properly and effectively exercised by the lessee.37 
The lessee brought an action against the lessor for specific performance 
of the option contract.38 In response, the lessor argued that the terms of 
the option required the lessee both to give written notice of intent to 
exercise the option and to complete the conveyance prior to the termina-
tion of the initial five-year term of the lease.39 As stated above, notice had 
been properly given according to the contract, but the conveyance was 
scheduled for after the termination of the lease term. 40 The Superior Court 
for Suffolk County agreed with the lessor and granted his motion for 
summary judgment.41 The plaintiff-lessee appealed and the appeals court 
reversed. 42 The appeals court found that the unequivocal language of the 
option provision gave the lessee the right to exercise the option simply by 
giving written notice at any time until the last day of the initial five-year 
lease term and that the lessee exercised the option in strict compliance 
with its terms in a timely way. 43 The court therefore held that a bilateral 
purchase and sale contract was formed. 44 
34 ld. 
35 Id. at 263-64, 457 N.E.2d at 670. 
36 Id. at 265, 457 N.E.2d at 670. 
37 ld. 
38 ld. 
39 /d. at 265, 457 N.E.2d at 670. The lessor also counterclaimed that if judgment should be 
rendered in favor of the plaintiff-lessee, directing the defendant-lessor to convey the prop-
erty to it, then the lessor should be entitled to reimbursement ofthe sum of $25,000 spent to 
improve the leased premises in reliance on the lessee's conduct in negotiating a new lease, 
because the lessor would not have made those expenditures had he known that the lessee 
intended to exercise the option. Id. 
40 See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. 
41 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 263, 457 N.E.2d at 669. 
42 Id. The case was remanded to the lower court for determination of the appropriate 
remedy. Id. 
43 Id. at 269, 457 N.E.2d at 673. 
44 ld. The Appeals Court noted that ordinarily in circumstances such as the ones in the 
present case the lessee would be entitled to specific performance of the option contract. /d. 
at 270, 457 N.E.2d at 673. The court stated, however, that a judge has a reasonable range of 
discretion to grant or deny specific performance and that specific performance can be 
refused if granting it would impose undue hardship upon one party to the agreement or 
permit the other party to obtain an inequitable advantage. I d. (quoting Freedman v. Walsh, 
331 Mass. 401, 406, 119 N.E.2d 419, 423 (1954)). The court found that the lessor's coun-
terclaim, see supra note 19, raised the question whether specific performance ought to be 
denied on equitable grounds because of the lessee's conduct in negotiating a new lease and 
delaying its exercise of the purchase option. 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 270, 457 N.E.2d at 673. 
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The court in Roberts-Neustadter distinguished between options that 
require purchase within a specified period of time but make no reference 
to notice as a method of acceptance, and options that expressly provide 
· that the optionee can exercise the option by giving riotice to the op-
tionor.45 In the former case, under Massachusetts law, the option can only 
be exercised by actual tender of the agreed purchase price within the time 
specified in the option.46 In the latter case, acceptance of the offer is 
accomplished by giving written notice in the manner and within the time 
period specified in the option. 47 The option inRoberts-Neustadter was of 
the second type.48 
The appeals court in Roberts-Neustadter construed the option agree-
ment as containing two time limitations. 49 The first limitation was that the 
lessee could only exercise the option by giving written notice within the 
initial five-year term of the lease. 5° No other condition was imposed for 
the effective exercise of the option.51 The second limitation was that the 
lessee specify in his notice the time for passage of title, which was to be 
neither less than sixty days nor more than ninety days from the giving of 
such notice.52 This second limitation, according to the court, related to the 
consummation of the purchase and sale contract created by the effective 
exercise ofthe lessee's option and not to the exercise of the option itself. 53 
As in American Oil Co., the agreement differentiated between the effec-
tive exercise of the option and the consummation of the closing.54 In 
Since the lessee's conduct caused the lessor to expend a considerable amount of money for 
improvements, the question also arose whether specific performance could be granted, but 
made conditional upon the lessee's paying the reasonable value of the improvements made 
by the lessor. !d. In light of the disputed question of material fact raised by the counterclaim, 
which had not been addressed by the lower court, the Appeals Court remanded the case to 
the superior court. /d. 
4
' /d. at 265, 457 N .E.2d at 670-71. 
46 !d. at 265, 457 N.E.2d at 670 (quoting Hurd v. Cornier, 358 Mass. 736, 267 N.E.2d 116 
(1971)); see also Hunt v. Bassett, 269 Mass. 298, 168 N.E. 783 (1929); Mayer v. Boston 
Metropolitan Airport, Inc., 355 Mass. 344, 244 N.E.2d 568 (1969). 
47 See, e.g., American Oil Co. v. Cherubini, 351 Mass. 581,222 N.E.2d 892 (1967); C. & 
W. Dyeing and Cleaning Co. v. De Quattro, 344 Mass. 739, 184 N.E.2d 61 (1962); Cities 
Service Oil Co. v. National Shawmut Bank, 342 Mass. 108, 172 N.E.2d 104 (1961). 
48 American Oil Co. v. Cherubini, 351 Mass. 581, 222 N.E.2d 892 (1967); C. & W. Dyeing 
and Cleaning Co. v. De Quattro, 344 Mass. 739, 184 N.E.2d 61 (1%2); Cities Service Oil Co. 
v. National Shawmut Bank, 342 Mass. 108, 172 N.E.2d 104 (1961), which the court cited 
repeatedly in Roberts-Neustadter, all involved options of the second type as well. 
49 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 268, 457 N.E.2d at 672. 
50 !d. 
SJ /d. 
52 /d. at 268-69, 457 N.E.2d at 672. 
53 /d. 
54 !d. at 268-69, 457 N.E.2d at 672-73. 
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contrast to the C. & W. Dyeing & Cleaning case, howeverr, there was no 
requirement that closing take place before the expiration of the lease.55 
The court also construed the language of the option as giving the lessee 
the right to exercise its option by giving notice until the ~ery end of the 
initial five-year term of the lease.56 Consequently, the court found that the 
lessee had timely exercised its option in strict compliance with its terms, 
thereby creating a bilateral purchase and sale contract to b¢ performed on 
the date indicated by the lessee, which was in accordbce with the 
option's requirement.57 
In Roberts-N eustadter, the appeals court clearly shoW!ed that option 
agreements must be construed strictly and in close adhetence with the 
ascertainable meaning of their language.58 The court noted that if the 
optionor intends to impose additional conditions and limitations on the 
manner or time for the effective exercise of the option, he c~n easily insert 
express language to that effect in the text of the option.59 In 1 the absence of 
express provisions, the court will not only refuse to imply additional 
requirements60 or to hear parol evidence explaining the ~ption's mean-
ing,61 but it will also take such an absence as an indi¢ation that no 
additional requirements were actually intended.62 This approach is sup-
ported by the leading commentators63 and is consistent "!ith Massachu-
setts precedent. 
Practitioners should be appreciative of the court's strict construction of 
option agreements. Adherence to the express language of the option adds 
certainty to the arrangements made between the parties! and prevents 
either party from trying to take advantage of favorable shift~ in the market 
while trying to shield themselves from unfavorable ones. A strict rule of 
interpretation also promotes careful and skillful drafting pn the part of 
counsel to achieve the exact allocation of risk as to markel prices that is 
I 
agreed upon by the parties to the contract. The incentive to use ambigu-
ous language that lends itself to self-serving arguments is, minimized by 
55 /d. at 268-69, 457 N.E.2d at 672. . 
56 /d. at 268-69, 457 N.E.2d at 673. The court distinguished betwee~ the rights of the 
lessee to exercise the option "right up to the last day" of the lease term, thereby giving rise 
to a~ enforceable bilateral ~urchase and ~ale contract, and the rights oft* lessee to obtain 
spectfic enforcement of satd contract, gtven that the lessee "strung [th~ lessor] along in 
negotiating a new lease causing the expenditure of a considerable amount of money for 
improvements." /d. at 270, 457 N.E.2d at 673. The court stated that although the enforcea-
bility of the contract was not in doubt, relief in the form of specific enforcement might be 
refused on equitable considerations. /d. at 27(}. 71, 457 N.E.2d at 673. 1 
57 /d. at 269, 457 N.E.2d at 673. 
58 /d. at 264-65, 269 n.3, 457 N.E.2d at 670, 673 n.3. 
59 /d. at 269 n.3, 457 N.E.2d at 673 n.3. 
60 /d. 
61 /d. at 269-70 n.4, 457 N .E.2d at 673 n.4. 
62 /d. at 269 n.3, 457 N.E.2d at 673 n.3. 
63 l S. WILLISTON, supra note l, at§ 610; IA A. CoRBIN, supra note 2, at§ 264. 
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the risk that courts will refuse to look beyond the four comers of the 
agreement. 
At the same time, however, it would be naive to believe that strict 
construction will provide an answer for every question. The Roberts-
Neustadter court acknowledged that unforeseen and probably unintended 
results are often produced by a strict interpretation of the language em-
ployed by the parties. The court noted that interpreting the lease in 
question as giving the lessee the right to exercise its option up to the very 
end of the lease term, while postponing the closing for sixty to ninety 
days, left a "two or three months hiatus" between the expiration of the 
lease and the consummation of the purchase and sale contract.64 Accord-
ing to the court, this occurrence "must be deemed to have been within the 
contemplation of the parties"65 and the lessee would clearly be "liable for 
rent (probably at the rate established by the lease)."66 The court, how-
ever, could point to no language in the agreement making express provi-
sion for this conclusion. A plausible argument could be made that the 
absence of an express provision indicated an implied understanding be-
tween the parties that the option should be exercised in time to allow the 
closing to take place before the expiration of the term of the lease. The 
court, however, was unwilling to read this understanding into the option 
agreement. 
In conclusion, courts in Massachusetts will continue to construe the 
language of option agreements strictly. When the optionee exercises the 
option in accord with the "ascertainable meaning" of the option terms, 
Massachusetts courts will hold that the optionor is bound to convey the 
property covered by the agreement, even though the consequences of the 
court's construction of the agreement would justify an argument that 
different terms were actually intended by the parties. The courts' refusal 
to look beyond the "four comers" of an option agreement creates an 
incentive for the parties and their counsel to draft option contracts care-
fully and unambiguously to reflect the exact allocation of risk agreed upon 
by the parties. 
§ 8.3. Security Interests in Aircraft- Notice of Prior Interest- Federal 
Preemption of G.L. c. 109. * During the Survey year, in South Shore Bank 
v. H & H Aircraft Sales, Inc. 1 the Massachusetts Appeals Court consid-
ered the issue of whether a security interest in an aircraft registered with 
64 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 269-70 n.4, 457 N .E.2d at 673 n.4. 
65 ld. 
66 ld. 
* Conant M. Webb, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 8.3. 1 16 Mass. App. Ct. 472, 452 N.E.2d 276 (1983). 
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the Federal Aviation Administration (''FAA'') takes priority over a prior, 
albeit unregistered, sale of the aircraft to a third party. In reaching its 
decision, the court applied the United States Supreme Court's holding in 
Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket2 that section 503 of the Federal Aviation 
Act of 19583 (the ''Act'') invalidates the transfer of aircraft with respect to 
third parties unless the transfer was evidenced by a written instrument 
recorded with the FAA.4 The Massachusetts Appeals Court in South 
Shore Bank held that a bank's security interest in an aircraft, if filed with 
the FAA, prevails over the right of a prior purchaser of the aircraft who 
purchased in a sale that was not recorded with the FAA.5 
In August of 1979, Olympic Sales Club, Inc. ("Olympic"), a Massachu-
setts corporation, contracted to purchase a particular aircraft from H & H 
Aircraft Sales, Inc. ("H & H"), a New York corporation, for $172,000 
and made a down payment on the contract price.6 The aircraft was 
delivered to Olympic in Massachusetts in October of 1979, at which time 
the balance of the purchase price was paid by Olympic. 7 H & H agreed to 
change the aircraft's registration number with the FAA and to register the 
transfer of ownership of the aircraft to Olympic with the FAA. 8 Although 
H & H later changed the registration number of the aircraft with the FAA, 
it did not record the bill of sale evidencing the transfer of ownership.9 
Subsequent to the sale of the aircraft to Olympic, the South Shore Bank 
made two loans to H & H in December of 1979, and a third loan in March 
of 1980.10 All three loans were secured under loan agreements that gave 
the bank security interests in the aircraft that previously had been sold to 
Olympic.U Prior to making each of the loans, the bank obtained a FAA 
title search of the FAA registry in Oklahoma City, which indicated that H 
& H was the registered owner of the aircraft. 12 The bank recorded its 
security interest with the FAA in January of 1980.13 In the course of 
attempting to take possession of the aircraft after H & H' s default in 
February of 1981,14 the bank discovered that H & H had sold the aircraft 
to Olympic before any of the loans had been made. 15 Olympic had not 
2 103 S. Ct. 2476 (1983). 
3 49 u.s.c. § 1403 (1982). 
4 Philko, 103 S. Ct. at 2477. 
5 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 475, 452 N.E.2d at 278. 
6 ld. at 472, 452 N.E.2d at 276. 
7 Id. at 472-73, 452 N.E.2d at 277. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 ld. The loans were for $86,000, $31,000 and $85,000 respectively. 
11 ld. 
12 ld. 
13 ld. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
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recorded its purchase of the aircraft with the FAA prior to the time the 
bank had recorded its lien, and had not recorded its interest in the aircraft 
with the FAA at the time of the suit.16 
The bank sued H & H, Olympic, and Olympic's president (and major 
shareholder) for possession of the aircraft, damages, an injunction against 
transfer of the aircraft, and declaratory relief,t7 and obtained temporary 
injunctive relief. 18 Subsequently, the bank, and Olympic and Olympic's 
president, filed cross-motions for summary judgment, relying on the facts 
as stated above. 19 The superior court granted summary judgment to the 
bank, including a judgment for immediate possession of the aircraft.20 
Olympic and Olympic's president appealed to the Massachusetts Appeals 
Court, 21 which held that the United States Supreme Court's interpretation 
of section 503 of the Act22 in the Philko case controlled, and affirmed the 
superior court's judgment of possession for the bank.23 
In Philko, a Mr. Smith sold and transferred possession of an aircraft to 
Mr. and Mrs. Shacket, but failed to register the sale with the FAA, despite 
assuring the Shackets that he would do so. 24 Smith then fraudulently 
purported to sell the same aircraft to Philko. 25 After inspecting the FAA 
title records, both Philko and the bank financing its purchase of the 
aircraft were satisfied with Smith's representation that the absent aircraft 
was away having electronics installed. 26 Subsequently, documents 
evidencing Philko' s purchase of the aircraft were recorded with the 
FAA.27 When the fraud became apparent, the Shackets filed suit to 
determine title to the aircraft.28 In its defense, Philko relied on section 
503(c) of the Act, which states that no conveyance of an aircraft, or of 
various aircraft parts, shall be valid against innocent third parties before a 
record of the conveyance is filed with the FAA. 29 The district court and 
16 /d. 
17 /d. at 472-74, 452 N.E.2d at 276-77. 
18 !d. at 474, 452 N.E.2d at 277. 
19 /d. 
20 /d. 
21 /d. 
22 49 u.s.c. § 1403 (1976). 
23 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 475, 452 N.E.2d at 278. 
24 Philko, 103 S. Ct. at 2477. The defendants also failed to register their title with the FAA, 
instead relying on Smith's assurance that he would record the transfer. /d. 
25 /d. 
26 /d. at 2477-78. The FAA records did not, however, reflect that Smith owned or ever had 
owned the aircraft. /d. at 2478 n.l. 
27 /d. at 2478. 
28 /d. 
29 Id. Section 503(c) of the Act is codified at 49 U.S. C.§ 1403(c), which states in relevant 
part: 
No conveyance or instrument, the recording of which is provided for by subsection 
(a) of this section shall be valid in respect of such aircraft ... against any person 
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the Seventh Circuit both held that the Act did not pr~empt state law 
concerning the validity of the transfer of the aircraft, and that therefore 
the Illinois version of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) applied.30 
Both courts found that the Shackets, as purchasers in the ordinary course 
of business under U.C.C. 1-201(9), had therefore obt~ined good title 
under either U.C.C. 2-403(2) or 2-403(1).31 i 
Philko appealed the decision of the Seventh Circuit, and the Supreme 
Court reversed.32 In its opinion, the Philko Court reasoned that Congress 
intended, in enacting section 503(c) of the Act, to require that before a 
transfer of aircraft can have effect on innocent third parfies, the transfer 
must be evidenced by an instrument recorded with the Ff\A.33 The Court 
stated that as Congress intended that the interests of inno¢ent third parties 
not be affected by unrecorded transfers of aircraft, it must also have been 
the intent of Congress to preempt state laws that provided that unre-
corded transfers would have effect against innocent thitd parties.34 The 
Philko Court determined that state law that enabled unreicorded transfers 
of aircraft to be valid against third parties was in conflict 1vith the intent of 
Congress to provide a central registry for interests in aircraft.35 Therefore, 
the Court held that state laws that allow undocumented or unrecorded 
transfers of aircraft to affect the rights of innocent third ~arties who have 
complied with the Act's registration provisions are p~eempted by the 
Act. 36 The Court limited the extent of the preemption of ~tate law regard-
ing priority of interests, however, by stating that while interests must be 
federally recorded before they can obtain the priority they are entitled to 
under state law, state law determines the priority ofinterests.37 The Court 
stated that state law is preempted by the Act only where ~ security holder 
has failed to record his interest with the FAA.38 
other than the person by whom the conveyance or other instrument is made or given, 
his heir or devisee, or any person having actual notice thereof, until such conveyance 
or other instrument is filed for recordation in the office of the Secretary of Transporta-
3:i~~~ck~t· v. Philko Aviation, Inc., 681 F.2d 506, 509-10(7th Cir. 19J2); Shacket v. Roger 
Smith Aircraft Sales, 497 F. Supp. 1262, 1266-67 (N.D. in. 1980). The I)linois version of the 
U.C.C. is ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, §§ 1-101 to -318 (Smith-Hurd 1974). 
31 Shacket v. Philko Aviation Inc., 681 F.2d 506, 5ll-l2 (7th Cir. 1982); Shacket v. Roger 
Smith Aircraft Sales, 497 F. Supp. 1262, 1266-71 (N.D. Ill. 1980). 
32 Philko, 103 S. Ct. at 2481. 
33 ld. at 2478. 
34 ld. at 2479. 
35 ld. 
36 ld. at 2480. 
37 !d. 
38 !d. (citing Scott, Liens in Aircraft: Priorities, 25 J. AIR L. & JOMMERCE, 193, 203 
(1958)). The Philko Court's holding that an interest must be federally ecorded before it is 
entitled to any priority under state law preempts any state priority rules hat give unrecorded 
interests priority over recorded interests. In one leading circuit case dea ing with preemption 
of state law by the Act prior to Philko, Judge Wisdom of the Fifth Circuit had decided that 
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In deciding a similar issue in South Shore, the Massachusetts Appeals 
Court stated that the Philko case39 governed, and that Philko made it 
unnecessary to discuss whether Massachusetts's enactment of the 
U.C.C., chapter 106, section 9-307, applied to the facts. 40 The appeals 
court likened Olympic's behavior in relying on H & H to record the 
transfer of the aircraft with the FAA to the Shackets' behavior in Philko. 41 
The appeals court noted that the Supreme Court had suggested that a 
holder of an unrecorded interest could assert it against a third party only if 
either (a) the third party had actual notice of the prior transfer or (b) the 
holder of the unrecorded interest had used reasonable diligence to file and 
thus could not be faulted for the failure of the crucial documents to be on 
record.42 The court rejected Olympic's contention that the bank had had 
actual notice of the sale of the aircraft prior to obtaining its security 
interest.43 Olympic had asserted that the bank's receipt of a large deposit 
from H & H from the proceeds of the sale of the aircraft to Olympic 
should have put the bank on notice of the sale. The appeals court ruled 
that because Olympic had moved for summary judgment, in effect repre-
senting that there were no genuine issues of material fact, the issue could 
not be raised for the first time on appeal. 44 
The Philko Court's extension of the preemptive effect of the Federal 
Aviation Act of 1958 to reject the effect of all unrecorded transfers of 
aircraft on the interests of innocent third parties is consistent with two 
primary objectives of the law in commercial contexts: simplicity and 
predictability. 45 One who wishes to ensure that there can be no competing 
interest in a particular aircraft can rely to a great extent on a title search 
the Act only preempted state law to the extent that it provided an exclusive registry for 
security interests in aircraft, but that the Act did not preempt state priority rules such as 
U.C.C. § 9-307(2) or § 9-310, which allow unrecorded interests to have priority over 
recorded interests in situations where policies other than encouraging recordation come into 
play. In re Gary Aircraft Corp., 681 F.2d 365, 370 (5th Cir. 1982). 
Although the Philko Court stated that it was inclined to agree with the rationale of In re 
Gary Aircraft, it clearly held that the Act rendered unrecorded transfers invalid as to 
innocent third parties irrespective of state law. Philko, 103 S. Ct. at 2481. 
39 !d. 
40 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 475-76, 452 N .E.2d at 278. 
41 !d. at 477, 452 N.E.2d at 279. 
42 !d. at 476-77, 452 N.E.2d at 279. In her concurrence to Philko, Justice O'Connor 
suggested that the Court should have refrained from suggesting that one who makes a 
reasonably diligent effort to record could obtain the protection of recordation because the 
issue had not been before the Court. Philko, 103 S. Ct. at 2481. 
43 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 477-79, 452 N.E.2d at 279-80. 
44 !d. at 479-80, 452 N.E.2d at 280-81. 
45 See, e.g., G.L. c. 109 § 1-102(2)(a), which provides: "The underlying purposes and 
policies of this act are ... to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial 
transactions.'' 
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with the FAA. In South Shore, the Massachusetts Appeal~ Court applied 
the rule of the Philko case in a straightforward manner, b~t suggested in 
dicta that the Massachusetts treatment of unrecorded transfers may be 
more liberal than the Philko decision.46 The court intimated that a reason-
able attempt to register a transfer of title with the FAA tha~ is unsuccess-
ful, by no fault of the claimant to the title, could provide ~n exception to 
the rule that the rights of innocent third parties cannot be !affected by an 
unrecorded interest in an aircraft. 47 
§ 8.4. Right of a Secured Creditor to Recover a Deficien~y - Failure to 
Conduct Foreclosure Sale in Commercially Reasonable M~er.* Under 
article 9 ofthe Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."),t tlhe default of a 
debtor who has signed a security agreement gives his secured creditor an 
automatic right to seize and sell collateral covered under the agreement.2 
Section 9-504(3) imposes upon the secured creditor an obligation to con-
duct the foreclosure sale of the debtor's collateral in a j 'commercially 
reasonable manner. " 3 This section seeks to ensure that the!sale brings fair 
market value for the collateral and thereby reduces the debtor's obligation 
to the greatest extent possible. If the foreclosure sale is conducted in a 
commercially reasonable manner and the proceeds of the tle fall short of 
satisfying the secured creditor's claim, the debtor remai s liable to the 
secured creditor for the deficiency. 4 Courts and comme tators are di-
vided, however, on the issue of whether a commercially reasonable fore-
closure sale is a precondition to the secured creditor's ability to recover a 
deficiency remaining after the sale.5 
46 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 476-77, 452 N .E.2d at 279. 
47 /d. . 
* Carolyn Dailey, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW 
§ 8.4. ' The Unifoon Commercial Code as adopted in Massachusettsiappears at G.L. c. 
106, §§ 1-101 - 9-507. 
2 G.L. c. 106, § 9-504. 
3 G.L. c. 106, § 9-504(3), provides in pertinent part: "(3)[E]very aspect of the disposition 
including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable." 
4 G.L. c. 106, § 9-504(2) states in pertinent part: "(2)1f the security interest secures an 
indebtedness, the secured party must account to the debtor for any s~rplmi, and, unless 
otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency." ! 
5 Compare Skeets v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 6~6 (W.D. Pa. 1963) 
(holding secured creditor barred from deficiency judgment after he failed to conduct a 
commercially reasonable foreclosure sale) with Savings Bank v. Booze, 34 Conn. Supp. 632, 
382 A.2d 266 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1978) (holding secured party not barred from deficiency 
judgment but placing burden of proof on secured creditor to show that $e sale yielded fair 
market value) with Leasco v. Sheridan Indus., Inc., 82 Misc. 2d 897,1371 N.Y.S.2d 531 
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1975) (placing burden on debtor to show harm from comnltercially unreason-
able sale in order to bar deficiency judgment). See Comment, Commercially Unreasonable 
Repossession Sales in Oklahoma: Wilkerson Motor Co. v. Johnson, 13 TULSA L.J. 820, 
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Courts have developed three general approaches for defining a secured 
creditor's right to a deficiency when he fails to comply with the provisions 
in part five of U .C.C. article 9.6 First, some jurisdictions completely bar a 
secured creditor from recovering a deficiency because of his non-
compliance.7 Second, other jurisdictions do not bar recovery of the 
deficiency, but create a rebuttable presumption that the collateral was 
worth at least the amount of the debt.8 To recover a deficiency, the burden 
of proof is then on the secured creditor to show that the noncompliance 
sale brought the fair market value of the collateral. 9 Finally, other jurisdic-
827-35 ( 1978); Henszey ,A Secured Creditor's Right to Collect a Deficiency Judgment Under 
UCC Section 9-504: A Need to Remedy the Impasse, 31 Bus. LAW. 2025, 2025-26 (1976); 
Comment, Creditor's Deficiency Judgment Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code: Effect of Lack of Notice and a Commercially Reasonable Sale, 33 Mo. L. REV. 327, 
327-28 (1973); J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 26-15 (2d ed. 
1980). 
6 13 TULSA L.J. at 828. 
7 The jurisdictions that have barred the deficiency are: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: 
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Lloyd, 12 U.C.C. Rep Serv. 15 (D.C. Super. 1973); FLORIDA: 
Turk v. St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co., 281 So. 2d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); 
GEORGIA: Gurwitch v. Luxurest Furniture Mfg. Co., 233 Ga. 934, 214 S.E.2d 373 (1975); 
MAINE: C.I.T. Corp. v. Haynes, 161 Me. 353, 212 A.2d 436 (1965); MICHIGAN: Cities 
Serv. Oil Co. v. Ferris, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 899 (Mich. Dist. Ct. 1971); NEW MEXICO: 
Foundation Discounts v. Serna, 81 N.M. 474,468 P.2d 875 (1970); OKLAHOMA: Davidson 
v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 559 P.2d 1228 (Okla. 1976); PENNSYLVANIA: Skeets v. 
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.O. Pa. 1963), modified on other 
grounds, 335 F.2d 846(3d Cir. 1964); UTAH: Chrys1erCredit Corp. v. Bums, 562 P.2d 233 
(Utah 1977); VIRGINIA: In re Bishop, 482 F.2d 381 (4th Cir. 1973); WYOMING: Aimovetto 
v. Keepes, 501 P.2d 1017 (Wyo. 1972). 
6 The jurisdictions not barring the recovery of a deficiency but placing the burden of proof 
on the secured creditor to show that the sale yielded the fair market value are: ALASKA: 
Kobuk Eng'r & Contracting Serv ., Inc. v. Superior Tank & Constr., 568 P.2d 1007 (Alaska 
1977); ARKANSAS: Farmers Equip. Co. v. Miller, 252 Ark. 1091, 482 S.W.2d 805, 810 
(1974); COLORADO: Community Management Ass'n v. Tousley, 32 Colo. App. 33, 505 
P.2d 1314 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973); CONNECTICUT: Savings Bank v. Booze, 34 Conn. Supp. 
632, 382 A.2d 266 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1978); ILLINOIS: General Foods Corp. v. Hall, 39 Ill. 
App. 3d 147, 349 N.E.2d 573 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976); INDIANA: Hall v. Owen County State 
Bank, 175 Ind. App. 150, 370 N.E.2d 918 (Ind. App. 1978); MISSISSIPPI: Walker v. V.M. 
Box Motor Co., 325 So. 2d 905 (Miss. 1976); NEBRASKA: Bank of Gering v. Glover, 192 
Neb. 575, 223 N.W.2d 56(1974); NEVADA: Levers v. Rio King Land lnv. Co., 93 Nev. 95, 
560 P.2d 917 (1977); NEW JERSEY: Franklin State Bank v. Parker, 135 N.J. Super. 476, 346 
A.2d 632 (Union County Court 1975); NEW MEXICO: Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands 
Forest Prods., Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 535 P.2d 1077 (1975); NEW YORK: Security Trust 
Co. v. Thomas, 59 A.D.2d 242, 399 N.Y.S.2d 511 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977); NORTH 
CAROLINA: Hodges v. Norton, 29 N.C. App. 193, 223 S.E.2d 848 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976); 
TENNESSEE: Investors Acceptance Co. v. James Tallcott, Inc., 61 Tenn. App. 307, 454 
S.W.2d 130(Tenn. Ct. App. 1969); TEXAS: United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501 F.2d 
692 (5th Cir. 1974). 
9 Henszey, supra note 5, at 2029-30. 
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i 
tions hold recovery is not absolutely barred and requite the debtor to 
prove noncompliance with part five and the sustaining ~f a loss. 10 
During the Survey year, the appeals court in Poti Ho*ing Co. Inc. v. 
Piggot 11 held that a secured creditor's failure to conduct ~foreclosure sale 
in a commercially reasonable manner did not preclude the secured credi-
tor from recovering the deficiency remaining after the sale.12 It was the 
first decision in which a Massachusetts higher court addressed the effect 
of a creditor's noncompliance with U.C.C. requirements for a foreclosure 
sale on the creditor's right to full satisfaction of his claim against the 
debtor. 13 In determining that the secured creditor's faih~re to conduct a 
commercially reasonable sale did not result in a forfeitur~ of his right to a 
deficiency judgment, the appeals court in Poti Holding k::'o. emphasized 
that the fair market value of the collateral had been rtalized from the 
foreclosure sale.14 Further, the court stressed that the ~ecured creditor 
had not engaged in "sharp or unconscionable practices." 15 In Poti Hold-
ing Co., the appeals court followed the current trend in other jurisdic-
tions16 of allowing a secured creditor who has failed to meet the U.C.C. 
requirements for a foreclosure sale to receive nevertheless a deficiency 
judgment if he can show that the sale yielded the fair market value of the 
collateral. 17 
In Poti Holding Co., a secured creditor whose debtor ~efaulted on the 
payment of a promissory note brought suit against the ~uarantor of the 
note. 18 The creditor had foreclosed on certain wire insu~ating machinery 
which was the collateral securing the note. 19 In its effort to sell the 
i 
10 The jurisdictions placing the burden of proof on the debtor to show harm are: MICHI-
GAN: Jones v. Morgan, 58 Mich. App. 35, 228 N.W.2d 419 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); 
MISSOURI: Wirth v. Heavey, 508 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); NEW MEXICO: 
Crosby v. Basin Motor Co., 83 N.M. 77, 488 P.2d 127 (1972); NEW YORK: Leasco v. 
Sheridan Indus., Inc., 82 Misc. 2d 897, 371 N.Y.S.2d 531 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1975); PENNSYL-
VANIA: Mercantile Fin. Corp. v. Miller, 292 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. iPa. 1%8); Alliance 
Discount v. Shaw, 195 Pa. Super. 601, 171 A.2d 548 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1~64); TENNESSEE: 
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Hold, 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 316 (Terln. Ct. App. 1975); 
WASHINGTON: Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash. Appl 866, 4% P.2d %6 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1972). . 
11 15 Mass. App. Ct. 275, 444 N.E.2d 1311 (1983). 
12 Id. at 280, 444 N.E.2d at 1314. 
13 Id. at 279, 444 N.E.2d at 1313-14. 
14 Id. at 276, 444 N.E.2d at 1312. 
15 Id. at 277, 444 N.E.2d at 1312. 
16 See Comment, Commercially Unreasonable Repossession Sales in Oklahoma: Wilker-
son Motor Co. v. Johnson, 13 TuLSA L.J. 820, 830 & n.49 (1978) and accompanying text 
(noting that the trend in other jurisdictions is to allow a deficien¢y judgment after a 
commercially unreasonable sale as long as the sale yielded fair markh value). 
17 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 277, 444 N.E.2d at 1312. 
18 Id. at 275, 444 N.E.2d at 1312. 
19 ld. 
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machinery, the creditor had placed advertisements in the Boston Herald 
American, the Wall Street Journal and a local newspaper.20 The creditor 
had also notified at least 210 parties, including the guarantor, and two of 
the nine or more companies in the eastern United States in the high 
temperature wire business.21 
The creditor finally sold the collateral for a price that the guarantor 
conceded was the fair market value.22 The proceeds from the sale, how-
ever, were insufficient to satisfy the debt claim.23 Consequently, the 
creditor brought suit against the guarantor, seeking to recover the 
deficiency amount. 24 
The superior court referred the case to a master.25 The master found 
that the sale had not been conducted in a commercially reasonable man-
ner under the U.C.C. standard. 26 In reaching this conclusion, the master 
relied on the fact that the creditor had not advertised in any publication of 
the wire industry .27 The master also observed that the creditor failed to 
submit evidence as to the normal commercial practices for disposing of 
collateral of this type, including the experience of the auctioneer, the area 
of circulation of the newspapers in which the advertisements were placed, 
and whether there were experienced brokers available to sell goods of this 
type.2s 
Nevertheless, based on the guarantor's prior admission that the ulti-
mate sale price was fair, the master concluded that the sale yielded the fair 
market value of the collateral. 29 The master left for the superior court the 
question of whether the creditor was entitled to recover any deficiency 
remaining after the sale in light of the fact that the creditor had failed to 
comply with the U.C.C.'s commercially reasonable standard.30 The 
superior court entered a judgment for the creditor in the amount of the 
deficiency because it found that the guarantor had not suffered any loss as 
a result of the sale.31 
The guarantor appealed on two grounds.32 First, the guarantor con-
tended that there was no competent evidence of the fair market value of 
20 Id. at 277, 444 N.E.2d at 1313. 
21 /d. 
22 ld. 
23 Id. at 275, 444 N.E.2d at 1312. 
24 Id. 
25 ld. 
26 ld. 
27 /d. at 277, 444 N.E.2d at 1312-13. 
28 ld. 
29 /d. at 278, 444 N.E.2d at 1313. 
30 Id. at 275-76, 444 N.E.2d at 1312. 
31 /d. at 276, 444 N.E.2d at 1312. 
32 ld. 
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the collateral,33 Second, the guarantor asserted that th~ creditor's non-
compliance with the commercially reasonable standard 1 governing fore-
closure sales precluded the creditor from obtaining a deficiency judg-
ment.34 
The appeals court affirmed the superior court's decis~on.35 The court 
held that the fair market value had been "conclusively !established" by 
the guarantor's prior admission as to the fair market va~ue of the collat-
eral.36 Furthermore, the appeals court determined that the creditor's 
commercially unreasonable sale did not mandate forfeiture of its right to 
recover the deficiency under either the U .C.C. or Massachusetts common 
law.37 
At the outset, the appeals court noted that authorities continue to 
disagree on the relationship between a creditor's noncompliance with 
U.C.C. standards and its right to recover a deficiency.38 The court ac-
knowledged cases and commentators supporting the gua[antor's position 
that a creditor's failure to comply with the U.C.C. prov~sions governing 
foreclosure sales triggers a forfeiture of its right to colleh any remaining 
deficiency.39 The court, however, rejected that absolute approach, con-
cluding instead that it should balance the equities between the parties and 
tailor the relief to the circumstances of the case. 40 
33 ld. 
34 ld. 
35 ld. 
36 ld. 
37 Jd. at 280, 444 N.E.2d at 1314. 
38 !d. at 277,444 N.E.2d at 1313 (citing J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, U~IFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE § 26-15 (2d ed. 1980)). I 
39 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 277-78, 444 N.E. 2d at 1313 (citing Gurwitch v. Luxurest Furniture 
Mfg. Co., 233 Ga. 934, 936, 214 S.E.2d 373, 375 (1975); Bank Josephine v. Conn., 599 
S.W.2d 773, 775 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); 2 GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL 
PROPERTY§ 44.9.4, at 1264 (l%5) (each taking the position that a creditor's noncompliance 
automatically bars him from recovering a deficiency)). The court also ~ited cases in which, 
unlike in Poti Holding Co., the creditorfailed to give the debtor notice! of sale, and thus the 
defect was well-defined. See, e.g., Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 
6%, 702 (W.D. Pa. 1%3), modified on other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964); Herman 
Ford-Mercury, Inc. v. Betts, 251 N.W.2d 492, 4% (Iowa 1977); Delay First Nat'!. Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Jacobsen Appliance Co., 196 Neb. 398, 409, 243 N.W.2d 745, 751 (1976); 
Camden Nat'!. Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d 329, 332 (Me. 1973). : 
40 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 278, 444 N.E.2d at 1313. The court cited niurnerous cases from 
other jurisdictions adopting this balancing approach: Barbour v. United States, 562 F.2d 19, 
21 (lOth Cir. 1977) (applying Kansas law); United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501 F.2d 
692, 695 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom., Baker v. United States, 421 U.S. 912 (1975) 
(applying Texas law); Kobuk Eng'r. & Contracting Serv., Inc. v. Supetior Tank & Constr., 
Inc., 568 P.2d 1007, 1013 (Alaska 1977); Universal C.I.T. Credit Co. v.iRone, 248 Ark. 665, 
669, 453 S.W.2d 37, 39 (1970); Savings Bank v. Booze, 34 Conn. SupJ. 632, 636-37 (1977); 
Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 175 Ind. App. 150(1977); Levers v. Rio King Land & Inv. 
Co., 93 Nev. 95, 99, 560 P.2d 917, 919 (1977); Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest 
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The court noted that Poti Holding Co. was a case of first impression in 
the Commonwealth regarding the specific issue of the effect of a creditor's 
noncompliance with U.C.C. standards on its ability to recover a 
deficiency. 41 Lacking any specific precedent, the court relied on analo-
gous Massachusetts cases and statements in the U.C.C. to conclude that 
the forfeiture of a deficiency judgment under such circumstances would 
be inappropriate.42 The court first supported its position by emphasizing 
the common law principle reflected consistently in its cases that the court 
disfavors forfeitures and penalties.43 More specifically, the court noted 
that in Massachusetts cases in which violations of the U.C.C. are not 
involved, but in which the creditor has acted unreasonably in some 
manner, the wrongdoings of a creditor do not normally preclude recovery 
of a deficiency.44 The court cited, for example, Mechanics Nat' I Bank v. 
Killeen,45 a contract action in which a bank was held liable in damages for 
wrongfully foreclosing on a debtor's stock.46 In that case, not only was 
there no suggestion that the debtor's remaining obligations were extin-
guished, but the obligations were reduced only by the fair market value of 
the stock at the time of wrongful sale.47 
Secondly, the court found support for its position in the U.C.C. which, 
the court noted, does not require automatic forfeiture as a result of 
creditor misconduct. 48 The court observed that article 9 of the U. C. C. 
provides specific remedies against a secured creditor who fails to sell 
collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. 49 A debtor, the court 
continued, may restrain an improper sale of collateral and has a right to 
recover from the secured creditor any loss caused by the failure to comply 
Prod., Inc., 87 N.M. 451,456, 535 P.2d 1077, 1081 (1975); cf. Franklin State Bank v. Parker, 
136 N.J. Super. 476, 482 (1975). 
41 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 279, 444 N.E.2d at 1313-14. 
42 /d. 
43 /d. (citing Valley Stream Teachers Fed. Credit Union v. Commissioner of Banks, 376 
Mass. 845, 852, 387 N.E.2d 200, 207 (1978); Shepard v. Finance Associates of Auburn, Inc., 
366 Mass. 182, 188, 315 N.E.2d 597, 602 (1974); Howard D. Johnson Co. v. Madigan, 361 
Mass. 454, 456, 280 N.E.2d 689, 69().91 (1972); Beach Associates, Inc. v. Fauser, 9 Mass. 
App. Ct. 386, 393-95 (1980); cf. Lowell v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 257, 
269, 47 N.E.2d 265, 272 (1943); Boott Mills v. Boston & Me. R.R., 218 Mass. 582, 589, 106 
N.E. 680, 683-84 (1914) (each holding no punitive damages in Massachusetts in absence of 
statute)). 
44 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 279, 444 N.E.2d at 1314. 
45 377 Mass. 100, 386 N.E.2d 1052 (1979). 
46 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 279, 444 N.E.2d at 1314. 
47 !d. The court also cited Lynn Five Cents Sav. Bank v. Portnoy, 306 Mass. 436, 439, 28 
N.E.2d 418, 421 (1940) (mortgagor released only to extent injured by conduct of mortgagee). 
48 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 279, 444 N.E.2d at 1314. 
49 !d. 
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with the U.C.C.50 Despite the inclusion of these specific remedies, the 
court emphasized that article 9 does not mention forfeiture of a creditor's 
right to a deficiency judgment because of an improper sal~ of collaterai.51 
Finally, the court turned to article 1 of the U.C.C. for ~upport. Article 
1, the court noted, directs that U.C.C. remedies are to be liberally admin-
istered in order that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position 
as if the other party had fully performed.52 More importa*tly for support 
of its stance against deficiency judgment forfeiture, the court emphasized 
that article 1 prohibits consequential, special and penal damages except as 
specifically allowed in the U .C.C. or by other rule of l~w .53 Given the 
specific remedies provided in the U .C.C., the historical reluctance of 
Massachusetts courts to impose forfeitures or to penalize creditor mis-
conduct, and the explicit statement in the U.C.C. against penalties, the 
court was unwilling to assume that the legislature intendeo to effect such 
forfeiture of private contractual rights.54 
The court then applied its approach to a secured creditor's right to a 
deficiency to the facts in Poti Holding Co. 55 The court, noting the lack of 
precision in the meaning of the term "commercially reas@nable" tried to 
determine whether the creditor had failed to fulfill the U .C.C. standards.56 
According to the court, the determination of whether a commercially 
reasonable sale occurred depends on the particular factsi of each case. 57 
The court, however, did not then explicitly state whether the sale was 
"commercially reasonable," but instead emphasized that the creditor had 
not engaged in "sharp or unconscionable practices. " 58 As a result, the 
court, apparently assuming the sale had not been conducted in a commer-
cially reasonable manner, concluded that because the fair market value 
was realized, the creditor could recover a deficiency .59 
In Poti Holding Co., the appeals court adopted the approach followed 
by most other jurisdictions that allows a secured creditor who has not 
satisfied U.C.C. requirements for a foreclosure sale to retain the right to a 
deficiency judgment if the sale yielded the fair market val6e of the collat-
eral. 60 The court also added a good faith requirement that the secured 
50 ld. 
31 ld. 
52 ld. 
53 Jd. at 279-80, 444 N.E.2d at 1314. 
54 ld. at 280,444 N.E.2d at 1314 (quoting Shepard v. Finance Associates of Auburn, Inc., 
366 Mass. 182, 188, 316 N.E.2d 597, 602 (1974)). 
55 Jd. at 277, 444 N.E.2d at 1313. 
56 Jd. 
57 ld. 
58 Jd. 
59 ld. at 280, 444 N.E.2d at 1314. The court never expressly stated that the sale had not 
been conducted in a commercially reasonable manner. 
60 ld. 
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creditor show he has not engaged in ''sharp or unconscionable prac-
tices. " 61 This approach is more reasonable than either completely barring 
the deficiency judgment or requiring the debtor to prove both the credi-
tor's noncompliance with article 9 in the conduct of the sale of collateral 
and a resulting loss. On one hand, the position automatically barring a 
deficiency judgment to a noncomplying creditor is unnecessarily harsh 
and amounts to punitive damages, which are disapproved of by both the 
U.C.C. and contract theory generally.62 On the other hand, the Poti 
Holding Co. approach recognizes that the secured creditor, having failed 
to comply with the U.C.C. must bear the burden of proving what price a 
proper sale would have brought.63 
Although the court chose the most reasonable approach, it left two 
critical issues unresolved. First, the court did not set out any guidelines 
for proving the fair market value of the collateral. 64 Second, the court did 
not address the more perplexing issue of how a secured creditor might 
prove that a proper sale would have brought that price.65 The court should 
resolve the issue of value determination in order for the adopted approach 
to become completely workable. 
In summary, after Poti Holding Co., a secured creditor who has failed 
to conduct a foreclosure sale in a commercially reasonable manner may 
nevertheless recover a deficiency judgment in Massachusetts. 66 In order 
to do so, it has the burden of proving two elements. First, the secured 
creditor must prove that the sale actually yielded the fair market value of 
the collateral. 57 Second, it must prove that it has not engaged in "sharp or 
unconscionable practices" in the course of foreclosure.68 The crucial 
question that was left open by the court is how, as a practical matter, 
secured creditors can prove that the foreclosure sale yielded the fair 
market value of the collateral. 69 
61 /d. 
62 G.L. c. 106, § 1-106 states in pertinent part that "neither consequential or special nor 
penal damages may be had except as specifically provided in this chapter or by other rule of 
law." 
63 Comment, supra note 5, at 327, 343. The proof incident to notice and resale is peculiarly 
within the creditor's knowledge. /d. 
64 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 280, 444 N.E.2d at 1314. The court stated that because the fair 
market value of the collateral in this case had been established conclusively, it had no 
occasion to discuss questions of the burden of proof or presumptions as to the value of the 
collateral. These are matters on which, the court acknowledged, the authorities are also 
divided. /d. (citing Utah Bank & Trust v. Quinn, 622 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah 1980)). 
65 See Henszey, supra note 5, at 2025-26. 
66 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 280, 444 N.E.2d at 1314. 
67 /d. 
68 /d. at 277, 444 N.E.2d at 1312. 
69 /d. at 280, 444 N.E.2d at 1314. 
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§ 8.5. Promissory Note - Accord and Satisfaction - Executory Accord.* 
During the Survey year, in Lipson v. Adelson, 1 the Massachusetts Ap-
peals Court considered the validity of two affirmative defenses to an 
action for recovery on a promissory note.2 The court was asked to 
consider when an executory accord can serve as an accord and satisfac-
tion, and whether chapter 106, section 3-606, of the Massachusetts Uni-
form Commercial Code (U.C.C.), can be invoked by co-signatories to a 
promissory note. 3 
When a contract has been breached by one of the parties, and, in an 
effort to settle their differences, the parties enter into a new and valid 
contract whereby the defaulting party promises to do some other act in 
lieu of performance of the original contract, the new agreement will be 
characterized either as an executory accord or as a substituted contract.4 
Generally the new agreement is considered to be an executory accord 
which acts as a defense to an action on the original contract only if its 
terms have been fully performed.5 An unexecuted accord usually does not 
operate to discharge liability on the original contract unless it appears that 
the parties intended the new contract to have that effect. In such a case 
the accord is in fact a substituted contract or a novation.6 Unfortunately, 
many parties fail to make clear or even consider whether they in fact 
intend the second agreement to discharge the obligations of the first 
contract. 7 Consequently, when a dispute arises, the courts are faced with 
difficult interpretational problems. 8 In Lipson, the appeals court found 
that, where no conflicting evidence is introduced and where a written 
contract gives no clear indication of the parties' intentions, the second 
agreement is, as a matter of law, an executory accord, which does not 
discharge the parties from liability. 9 
In addition to addressing the issue of the character of the second 
agreement, the Lipson court also considered whether the co-signatory to 
* Andrea Petersen, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 8.5 1 17 Mass. App. Ct. 90, 456 N.E.2d 470 (1983). 
2 Brief for Plaintiff at 1. 
3 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 95, 456 N.E.2d at 473. G.L. c. 106, § 3-606 provides: 
The holder discharges any party to the instrument to the extent that without such 
party's consent the holder ... without express reservation of rights releases or agrees 
not to sue any person against whom the party has to the knowledge of the holder a 
right of recourse or agrees to suspend the right to enforce against such person the 
instrument or collateral or otherwise discharges such person. 
4 SIMPSON AND ALPERIN, SUMMARY OF BASIC LAW, 14 MASS. PRACTICE SERIES§ 838 (2d 
ed. 1974). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 6 A. CoRBIN, CoNTRACTS§ 1269, at 1027-28 (1952). 
8 Id. 
9 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 94-95, 456 N.E.2d at 473. 
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the original contract, who did not sign the second agreement, was dis-
charged from her obligations under the first contract by virtue of Chapter 
106, section 3-606.10 Section 3-606 states that the holder of a promissory 
note discharges "any party to an instrument" ifthe holder agrees, without 
the party's consent, not to sue any person against whom the party has, to 
the knowledge of the holder, a right of recourse.U The use of the words 
"any party to the instrument" has caused the courts some problems of 
interpretation. 12 According to the Official Comments to the U.C.C., the 
words "any party" were intended to cover anyone "in the position of a 
surety, having a right of recourse ·either on the instrument or dehors it 
including an accommodation maker or acceptor known to the holder to be 
so." 13 
The explanation has left some room for debate as to whether co-makers 
come under the protection of section 3-606.14 According to one view, 
co-makers who have the right to claim contribution from each other have 
a right of recourse against each other and therefore fall within the stat-
uteY Other courts, however, have held that co-makers per se cannot 
claim the section 3-606 defense. 16 In Lipson the appeals court indicated, 
albeit not explicitly, that it preferred the second position. 17 
In 1970, defendants Sheldon and Sandra Adelson executed a promis-
sory note which the plaintiff Mr. Lipson signed as an accommodation 
party.18 When the Adelsons did not pay the note as it became due, 
demand was made on Lipson, who paid it and thereby became the holder 
of the note. 19 Three years later, Lipson, Mr. Adelson, and a third party, 
Mr. Shapiro, signed an agreement in which Adelson acknowledged his 
debt to Lipson. 20 The agreement further stated that Mr. Lipson had 
lawsuits pending against both Mr. Adelson and Mr. Shapiro, and that all 
three parties desired to settle their differences out of court.21 The agree-
10 !d. at 95, 456 N.E.2d at 473. 
11 G.L. c. 106, § 3-606. 
12 See Woholler v. St. Charles Lumber and Fuel Co., 25 Ill. App. 3d 812, 323 N.E.2d 134, 
aff'd, 62 Ill. 2d 16, 338 N.E.2d 179 (1975); Beneficial Finance Co. of New York, Inc. v. 
Rusher, 82 Misc. 2d 550, 369 N.Y.S.2d 975 (1975). 
13 G.L. c. 106, § 3-606 (official comment). 
14 See supra note 12. 
15 Beneficial Finance Co. of New York, Inc. v. Rusher, 82 Misc. 2d at 552,369 N.Y.S.2d 
at 977. 
16 See Woholler v. St. Charles Lumber Fuel Co., 62 Ill. 2d 16, 20, 338 N.E.2d 179, 181 
(1975). 
17 See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. 
18 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 90, 456 N.E.2d at 470, 471. 
19 /d. at 90, 456 N.E.2d at 471. 
20 /d. at 91, 456 N.E.2d at 471. 
21 /d. 
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ment then provided for a three year moratorium of the principal payments 
due to Lipson and monthly payments of the interest then due in addition 
to a payment representing 7.5 percent interest on the principal owed.22 In 
addition, Mr. Shapiro was to exercise an option allegedly assigned to him 
by Adelson to purchase certain shares of stock with an advance from 
Lipson, and put those shares into an escrow account for Lipson as 
security for Adelson's debt, subject to his paying the debt represented by 
the principal and interest payments and the funds advanced by Lipson to 
Shapiro for exercising the stock options.23 
The stock option was exercised and the shares put into escrow, but 
Adelson did not make his payments.24 At the end of the moratorium, 
Lipson chose not to exercise his stock option. Instead, he brought an 
action against Sheldon and Sandra Adelson to recover on the original 
promissory note.25 
At trial the defendants pleaded as affirmative defenses: 1) failure to 
state a claim, 2) statute of limitations, and 3) estoppel.26 The superior 
court granted summary judgment against both defendants and they ap-
pealed.27 On appeal the defendants claimed that summary judgment 
should not have been allowed and advanced two new arguments for 
avoidance of their debt.28 The first argument was that the agreement 
between Mr. Adelson, Lipson, and Shapiro was a substituted contract 
that discharged the Adelsons from their obligation on the original promis-
sory note.29 The second argument was that even if the 1973 agreement did 
not discharge Mr. Adelson, it did discharge Mrs. Adelson, who was not a 
signatory to the later agreement and thus did not consent to the 
moratorium. 30 
Addressing first the question of the substituted contract, the appeals 
court held that whether the second, 1973 agreement was a substituted 
contract or an executory accord was a question of law and not a question 
of fact for a jury Y The court explained that because an accord by itself 
rarely operates to discharge a preexisting indebtedness, a finding to that 
effect would have to be based on a clear and definitive indication of the 
parties' intent.32 
22 ld. 
23 Jd. at 91-92, 456 N.E.2d at 471. 
24 Jd. at 92, 456 N.E.2d at 471. 
25 Jd. at 90, 456 N.E.2d at 471. 
26 Brief for Plaintiff at 6. 
27 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 90, 456 N.E.2d at 471. 
28 Brief for Plaintiff at 6. 
29 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 92, 456 N.E.2d at 471. 
30 Jd. at 95, 456 N.E.2d at 473. 
31 Jd. at 92, 456 N.E.2d at 471. 
32 Jd. at 92-93, 456 N.E.2d at 472. 
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In order to determine intent of the parties, the court examined the 
language of the 1973 agreement.33 Carefully scrutinizing "nuances of 
expression," the court failed to discern any clear reference to the inten-
tion of the parties.34 The court acknowledged that it could be legitimate to 
infer the creation of a substituted contract or a novation despite the lack 
of express language to that effect. 35 According to the court, however, the 
agreement provided no basis for such an inference.36 As a final step in 
interpreting the agreement, the court applied what it referred to as the 
"inconsistency principle. " 37 According to that principle, the court stated, 
the inconsistency between two agreements can be a valid indication of a 
substituted contract.38 Although the court accepted the validity of the 
principle, it stated that, for the principle to apply, the substitution had to 
show an intention that was contrary to the intention ofthe first contract.39 
For example, the court explained, a second contract containing a revised 
payment schedule to accommodate the debtor does not constitute a show-
ing that the creditor intended to reject the original timetable. 40 By the 
same token, an intention to work out a settlement does not by itself show 
that the parties intended to discharge preexisting obligationsY 
Applying the above methods of interpretation, the court failed to find a 
clear indication of the parties' intent to discharge the obligations incurred 
on the promissory note when they signed the 1973 agreement.42 Conse-
quently, the court held that the agreement was not a substituted contract 
that discharged the defendants of their liability on the original note.43 
Turning to the defendants' second argument, the appeals court rejected 
the contention that Lipson's agreement with Mr. Adelson and Shapiro 
discharged Mrs. Adelson from her obligation on the promissory note. 44 
Mrs. Adelson asserted that she fell within the language of Chapter 106, 
section 3-606(1)(a), and thus was released from all obligations on the 
debt.45 The court gave two grounds for holding that the 1973 agreement 
did not discharge Mrs. Adelson from her original obligation on the note.46 
33 /d. at 93, 456 N.E.2d at 472. 
34 /d. at 94, 456 N.E.2d at 472. 
35 /d. 
36 /d. 
37 /d. at 94, 456 N.E.2d at 473. 
38 /d. 
39 /d. 
40 /d. 
41 /d. 
42 /d. 
43 /d. 
44 /d. at 95, 456 N .E.2d at 473. 
45 !d. (quoting G.L. c. 106, § 3-606(1)(a)). See supra note 3 for text of§ 3-606(1)(a). 
46 /d. 
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First, according to the court, the holder, Lipson, had not acted without 
Mrs. Adelson's consent when he signed the 1973 agreement.47 The court 
found that Mrs. Adelson had in fact given advance consent to the 1973 
agreement when she signed the original promissory note which stated that 
"each party hereby waives any defense by reason of any extension of 
time for payment or other indulgence granted to any party liable here-
on. " 48 Second, the court concluded that Mrs. Adelson had not proved 
that she was covered by the statute.49 According to the court, section 
3-606 by its terms covers only parties who have recourse against those 
persons released by the holder.50 The court found that Mrs. Adelson made 
no showing that she would have had a right of recourse against her 
husband.51 
In sum, the Lipson court rejected both of the defendants' arguments 
that they were discharged from their contractual liability to the plaintiff by 
virtue of a subsequent agreement of accord. In discussing the defense of 
accord and satisfaction and the suretyship defense provided by Chapter 
106, section 3-606, the appeals court shed some light on two areas of 
uncertainty. 
First, in cases where parties to a broker agreement sign a written 
agreement of accord, and a dispute later arises as to whether the second 
agreement by itself was intended to discharge the obligations of the 
original contract, the courts are often faced with the difficult task of trying 
to find evidence of intentions that were never expressed or even consid-
ered.52 Where, as in Lipson, the original debt was undisputed, liquidated, 
and matured, courts are more likely to find an accord than a substituted 
contract. 53 In Lipson, however, the court went further, proposing as a rule 
of construction that where the issue is whether a written agreement is an 
executory. accord or a substituted contract, the agreement is an executory 
accord unless there is a clear and definite indication to the contrary .54 It is 
unclear, however, how broadly this rule can be applied. In Lipson, the 
debt was undisputed, and both the first and second agreements were 
breached by the debtor. While courts in cases similar to Lipson usually 
find in favor of the creditor and allow recovery on the first contract, the 
47 /d. 
48 /d. (quoting § 3-606 comment 2, 2 Uniform Laws Annot., U.C.C., at 585 (1977)) 
("consent may be given in advance, and is commonly incorporated in the instrument"). 
49 /d. 
50 G.L. c. 106, § 3-606(1)(a). 
51 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 95, 456 N.E.2d at 473. 
52 6 A. CoRBIN, supra note 7, § 1269 at 1028. 
53 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 93 n.3, 456 N.E.2d at 472 n.3 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 279, comment C (1981)). 
54 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 92, 456 N.E.2d at 472. 
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same courts are more likely to find in favor of the debtor where it is the 
creditor who breaks the second agreement. 55 
Second, in addition to outlining the requirements necessary to demon-
strate that a written accord constitutes both accord and satisfaction, the 
Lipson court looked at an ambiguous area in section 3-606 of the U. C. C. 
According to that provision, any party to a note can claim discharge of 
liability, if, without his consent or a reservation of rights, the holder of the 
instrument releases or promises not to sue a person against whom the 
party has recourse. 56 The Supreme Judicial Court has held that the pri-
mary justification for the provision is the protection of parties who, upon 
paying the note, have a right of recourse against the principal debtor but 
are subrogated to the holder's rights.57 According to the Official Com-
ments to the U. C. C., the provision uses the words ''any party'' in order to 
make it clear that the suretyship defenses provided by section 3-606 are 
not "limited to the parties who are 'secondarily liable' but are available to 
any party who is in the position of a surety including an accommodation 
maker or acceptor known to the holder to be so."58 The "knotty ques-
tion" is whether suretyship defenses extend not only to an accommoda-
tion maker, but also to a co-maker who has not signed as an accommoda-
tion for the other co-maker.59 
In Lipson, no explicit reference is made to Mrs. Adelson's status as a 
signatory on the promissory note. From the court's description of the 
facts, in which the Adelsons are referred to as signers of the note and 
Lipson is referred to as the accommodation party, 60 it can be inferred that 
the court assumed that Mr. and Mrs. Adelson were co-makers. This 
inference is further supported by the fact that, in holding that Mrs. 
Adelson was not protected by section 3-606, the court cited two cases in 
which the issue was whether co-makers were protected by the statute.61 
The first case, from Illinois, stands for the proposition that co-makers per 
se are not covered by section 3-606.62 The Lipson court contrasted the 
Illinois case63 to a New York case which held that a co-maker who has a 
right of contribution from another co-maker has a right of recourse within 
the meaning of section 3-606.64 
55 A. CoRBIN, supra note 7, § 1293, at 1050. 
56 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 95, 456 N.E.2d at 473. 
57 Stanley v. Ames, 378 Mass. 364, 367, 391 N.E.2d 908, 911 (1979). 
58 U.C.C. § 3-606 comment 1. 
59 Beneficial Finance Co. of New York, Inc. v. Rusher, 82 Misc. 2d 550, 369 N. Y.S.2d 
975 (1975). 
60 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 90,456 N.E.2d at 470.71. 
61 See supra note 15. 
62 Woholler v. St. Charles Lumber and Fuel Co., 62 Ill. 2d 16, 20, 338 N.E.2d 179, 181 
(1975). 
63 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 95, 456 N.E.2d at 473. 
64 Beneficial Finance Co. of New York, Inc. v. Rusher, 82 Misc. 2d 550, 552, 369 
N. Y.S.2d 975, 977 (1975). 
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Even if the inference is correct that the Lipson court regarded Mr. and 
Mrs. Adelson as co-makers, it is still unclear whether the appeals court 
held that Mrs. Adelson was not covered by section 3-606 because that 
provision does not cover co-makers or because, as a co-maker, she had 
not demonstrated that she would have had recourse against her husband. 
Although the order of the cites to other jurisdictions suggests that co-
makers to a note are not covered by section 3-606, the language of the 
opinion suggests that the court favored the proposition that co-makers are 
covered by the provision if they can prove a right of contribution. Unfor-
tunately the Lipson court did not provide any clarification in this area. 
